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INTRODUCTION
On July 22, 2004, the independent National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, popularly known as the
"9/11 Commission," released its final report.2 The report details the
events leading to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington
on September 11, 2001, the government's response to the attacks, and
recommendations for reorganizing government intelligence agencies
to make less likely another terrorist attack on United States soil.' In
the months following the release of the report, committees in both
houses of Congress held hearings and resolved to act quickly to
1. Statement by the 9/11 Commission, at http://www.9-llcommission.gov/press/
pr_2003-11-12.pdf (Nov. 12, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
2. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (auth. ed. 2004)
[hereinafter 9/11 REPORT], available at http://www.9-1lcommission.gov/report/
911Report.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The ten commissioners and
eighty staff members culled through more than 2.5 million pages of documents,
interviewed more than 1,200 individuals in ten countries, held nineteen days of hearings,
and heard public testimony from 160 witnesses. Id. at xiii, xv.
3. Thomas H. Kean & Lee H. Hamilton, Public Statement: Release of 9/11
Commission Report, at http://www.9-1lcommission.gov/report/9llReport-Statement.pdf
(July 22, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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implement the Commission's recommendations.4 Upon receipt of the
Commission's report, President Bush also signaled an interest in
"mov[ing] forward" to work with Congress to implement the
Commission's recommendations.'
Although the release of the Commission's report shifted
attention from the Commission itself to the implementation of the
Commission's recommendations, the "unprecedented"6 level of
information sharing that allowed the Commission to do its work is
worthy of examination. From 2003 through early 2004, the
Commission and the executive branch engaged in much-publicized
negotiations about inter-branch information sharing.7 One critical
roadblock was the Commission's institutional establishment in the
legislative branch.8  Because of the Commission's "legislative"
designation, the Commission's search for executive branch
information implicated the constitutional separation-of-powers
doctrine and the related doctrine of executive privilege.' In
4. See, e.g., 9/11 Commission Report Implementation Act of 2004, H.R. 5040, 108th
Cong. (2004); S. 2774, 108th Cong. (2004) (demonstrating Congress's resolve).
5. Press Release, President Receives 9/11 Report: Remarks by the President on the
9/11 Commission Report, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040722-
5.html (July 22, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). After months of
debate, many of the 9/11 Commission's recommended executive branch reforms were
enacted in late 2004. National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat.
3638. See Peter Baker & Walter Pincus, Bush Signs Intelligence Reform Bill, WASH. POST,
Dec. 18,2004, at Al.
6. Both the Commission and the executive branch used the word "unprecedented"
to describe the Commission's access, as have journalists. See Thomas H. Kean & Lee H.
Hamilton, Editorial, 9/11 Panel: Free to Probe, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2003, at A23.
7. See generally Elizabeth Drew, Pinning the Blame, 51 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Sept.
23, 2004, at 6 (providing a thorough history of the negotiations between the Commission
and the executive branch).
8. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, tit.
VI, 116 Stat. 2408 (2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 101 note (Supp. 2004)) (§ 601: "There is
established in the legislative branch the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States."), amended by Act of Mar. 16, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-207, 118 Stat. 556
(amending § 610 to extend Commission deadline by sixty days); see also infra note 37 and
accompanying text (noting that the 9/11 Commission's placement in the legislative branch
was unique).
9. Executive privilege is rooted in the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers
and exempts the executive branch from disclosing internal information, particularly
information related to national security and foreign policy. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
554 (2d pocket ed. 2001). However, as one scholar has noted,
No constitutional language authorizes the President to withhold documents from
Congress, nor does any provision empower Congress to demand and receive
information from the executive branch.... The difficult and unpredictable issue is
how to resolve two implied powers when they collide. Court cases occasionally
provide guidance, but most of the disputes are resolved through political
accommodations.
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responding to the Commission's requests for access to executive
branch information, the White House sought to retain control over
proprietary information and testimony with the stated purpose of
preserving the separation between the executive and legislative
branches and the sanctity of deliberative intra-executive branch
communications. For example, when responding to Commission
requests for executive branch officials to testify before the
Commission, then-White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales wrote:
Based on principles underlying the Constitutional separation of
powers, Presidents of both parties have long taken the position
that White House advisors and staff are not subject to the
jurisdiction of legislative bodies and do not provide testimony-
even on a voluntary basis-on policy matters discussed within
the White House or advice given to the President."°
Despite the Commission's acknowledgment of the executive branch's
constitutional concerns, the Commission claimed that its broad
statutory mandate 1 entitled it to request sensitive information from
the executive branch.12
This Recent Development discusses the creation of the
Commission and the Commission's requests for information from the
executive branch and examines the information-sharing agreements
that evolved. 3 This piece focuses on three of the most publicized
access-related issues in the Commission's investigation: the
Commission's access to intelligence materials from the President's
LouIs FISHER, THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 3 (2004). See Loving v. United
States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996), for a leading Court articulation of separation of powers in
which the Court declared, "It remains a basic [constitutional] principle ... that one branch
of the Government may not intrude upon the central prerogatives of another." See United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974), for a discussion of presidential privilege in which
the Court justified the doctrine of executive privilege based on the requirement that the
president and his advisors must be able to "explore alternatives in the process of shaping
policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express
except privately."
10. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Thomas H. Kean,
Chairman, and Lee H. Hamilton, Vice Chairman, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2004/03/20040330-3.html (Mar. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Gonzales Letter]
(explaining the White House position) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
11. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Transcript, 9/11 Commission Press Briefing, at 4 (July 8, 2003), at
http://www.9-llcommission.gov/archive/2003-07-08-press-briefing.pdf [hereinafter July 8
Press Briefing] (using the Commission's broad mandate as a basis for its information
requests) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
13. See, e.g., Mike Allen & Dan Eggen, President to Let Rice Testify About 9/11,
WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2004, at Al; David E. Sanger, When Goals Meet Reality, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at Al, for background on these agreements.
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Daily Brief ("PDB"); the President's decision to allow National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to testify before the Commission
under oath; and the President's meeting with the Commission.
Against the backdrop of the judiciary's reluctance to intervene in
legislative-executive information disputes, this piece assesses whether
the 9/11 Commission's access to executive branch information set
legal precedent for legislative-executive information sharing. 4 This
Recent Development concludes that the compromises reached are
unlikely to have legal precedential value. However, the political
process that prompted the executive branch and the Commission to
compromise may have lasting implications for legislative-executive
information-sharing accommodations and could influence the
judiciary's willingness to intervene.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE COMMISSION
The creation of an independent commission to investigate the
events leading to the September 11 terrorist. attacks and generate
recommendations to avoid future terrorist attacks created significant
controversy. Supporters in Congress and the families of the victims of
September 11 argued that the benefit of an independent commission
investigation versus a congressional committee investigation was at
least three-fold: first, Congress could give the commission broader
jurisdiction than any single congressional committee had; 5 second, an
independent commission would be able to take a more objective view
of intelligence failures prior to September 11 than members of
Congress since commission members would have had little or no
14. Some commentators and press accounts suggest that it did. For example,
Washington Post columnist David Broder argued that:
[Bush] received a fig leaf concession from the commission and leaders of
Congress-the statement that Rice's appearance would not be treated as a
precedent.... But a precedent it is-and it certainly will be cited the next time a
congressional committee or commission wants to go fishing for revelations from
the White House.
David Broder, Editorial, Bush's Surrender, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2004, at A31. See also
Dan Eggen, 9/11 Panel to Have Rare Glimpse of Presidential Briefings, WASH. POST, Nov.
16, 2003, at A9 (reporting that, after the White House agreed to the limited release of
PDB material, a Senate Intelligence Committee staffer stated, " '[Ais a permanent
legislative committee, [we] would certainly hope to receive equal treatment to a
temporary commission.' ").
15. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S4451 (daily ed. May 15, 2002) (Sen. Toricelli noting
that a congressional Intelligence Committee review would be able to address only one
aspect of the government's actions); id. (daily ed. May 15, 2002) (Sen. Lieberman arguing
that an independent commission would look at intelligence, law enforcement, foreign
policy, and immigration).
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personal involvement in structuring or oversight of those policies; 6
and, third, an independent, bipartisan panel comprised of private
citizens would reduce the likelihood of political posturing and
enhance the credibility of the investigation and the resulting
recommendations. 7
However, despite the well-established precedent for the creation
of independent commissions to study national tragedies,"8 influential
members of Congress and executive branch officials, including the
President, initially opposed the creation of an independent
September 11 commission. 19 Critics argued that Congress had already
16. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. H5435 (daily ed. July 24, 2002) (Rep. Pelosi arguing that
an independent commission would provide "fresh eyes" and take an "entrepreneurial
look" at possible reforms); 148 CONG. REC. S4450 (daily ed. May 15, 2002) (Sen. Toricelli
advocating for an independent commission that would provide a "dispassionate and
honest" assessment of government agency knowledge, performance, and coordination).
Ultimately, however, among the ten commissioners, three-former United States Senator
Slade Gorton and former United States House members Lee Hamilton and Tim
Roemer-had been involved in intelligence or aviation oversight as members of Congress.
See Biographical Information-Commission Members, at http://www.9-llcommission.gov/
aboutlbios.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
17. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S9084 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2002) (Sen. Hatch calling for a
"detached and objective analysis of mistakes ... in the days and months before that
attack"); 148 CONG. REC. H5438 (daily ed. July 24, 2002) (Rep. Rohrabacher noting that
an independent commission would eliminate the risk of personal political concerns
interfering with an honest assessment of policy failures); 148 CONG. REC. H5432 (daily ed.
July 24, 2002) (Rep. Holt arguing for a bipartisan independent commission that "would
report its findings and conclusions in a way that would earn the trust of the American
public"); 148 CONG. REC. S4451-52 (daily ed. May 15, 2002) (Sen. Lieberman calling for a
"nonpolitical citizens commission" that would bring "credibility" to the investigation); see
also Michael Vasquez, Sept. 11 Families Join Call for Probe, WASH. POST, June 12, 2002,
at B8 (citing family members' concern that an internal government investigation would
not be objective).
18. During congressional debate, members of the House and Senate named
commissions they saw as setting precedent for an independent 9/11 Commission. See, e.g.,
148 CONG. REC. H5434 (daily ed. July 24, 2002) (Rep. Kind mentioning the commission to
study the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon); 148 CONG. REC. H5430 (daily ed.
July 24, 2002) (Rep. Roemer discussing the commission appointed after the Khobar
Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia); 147 CONG. REC. S10268-69 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 2001)
(Sen. Torricelli discussing the appointment of commissions after the Civil War, the sinking
of the Titanic, Pearl Harbor, and the Challenger explosion). See generally CARL MARCY,
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONS (Da Capo Press ed. 1973) (1945) (discussing history of
commissions and boards of inquiry); THOMAS R. WOLANIN, PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY
COMMISSIONS: TRUMAN TO NIXON (1975) (discussing creation and impact of presidential
commissions).
19. See Mike Allen, Bush Seeks to Restrict Hill Probes of 9/11, WASH. POST, Jan. 30,
2002, at A4 (presenting the White House's initial position); David E. Rosenbaum, Bush
Bucks Tradition on Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2002, at A18 (same); see also Helen
Dewar, House GOP Stops 9/11 Probe Plan, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2002, at A14 (discussing
House, Senate, and White House negotiations on the formation of an independent
commission).
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created a joint House-Senate committee (the "Joint Inquiry") to
investigate intelligence failures leading to September 11; 21 they
reasoned that the intelligence community should not be burdened by
multiple investigations and posited that too much sensitive
information would be involved to allow a citizens' commission to
conduct a thorough review.21  The White House argued that the
intelligence community needed to focus on the recently-initiated war
in Afghanistan and worried that an investigation would embarrass
government officials in charge of the war effort.22
However, by late 2002, House members and Senators involved in
the Joint Inquiry agreed on the inadequacy of the congressional
investigation. 23  Legislators expressed concern about the time and
resources the Joint Inquiry had expended on preliminary hearings,
press leaks about intelligence failures that had sidetracked the Joint
Inquiry's attention, and the narrow, intelligence-oriented focus of the
Joint Inquiry's investigation.24 Strong support for an independent
commission in Congress, along with increased pressure from family
members of the September 11 victims,21 led the White House to
20. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. H5431, 5435 (daily ed. July 24, 2002) (statements of
Rep. LaHood, Rep. Chambliss); 148 CONG. REC. S4452 (daily ed. May 16, 2002)
(statement of Sen. Kyl). The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence issued the "Joint Inquiry" report in late 2002.
See REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
AND THE UNITED STATES HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
JOINT INQUIRY INTO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE
TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPT. 11, 2001, S. REP. No. 107-351, H. R. REP. NO. 107-792
(2002) [hereinafter JOINT INQUIRY REPORT].
21. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. H5431, 5435 (daily ed. July 24, 2002) (statements of
Rep. LaHood, Rep. Chambliss); 148 CONG. REC. S4452 (daily ed. May 16, 2002)
(statement of Sen. Kyl).
22. David Firestone & James Risen, White House, In Shift, Backs 9/11 Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002, at Al; see also Allen, supra note 19.
23. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S9084-87 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2002) (statements of Joint
Inquiry members Sen. Kyl and Sen. Shelby, as well as Sen. Specter, explaining shift in
position to support commission); see also Dana Milbank, Barriers to 9/11 Inquiry Decried,
WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2002, at A14 (reporting that difficulty securing access to
intelligence information strengthened support for an independent commission among
members of Congress).
24. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S9084-87 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2002) (statements of Sen.
Kyl, Sen. Shelby, Sen. Specter).
25. See Firestone & Risen, supra note 22; see also 108 CONG. REC. S10876 (daily ed.
Nov. 13, 2003) (Sen. Lieberman: "[Ijt is the clear desire of the families of the victims of
September 11 that this commission be created by Congress."). See generally Family
Steering Committee for the 9/11 Independent Commission-Our Goals, at
http://www.911independentcommission.org/goals.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2005)
(illustrating the families were adamant that the Commission be independent of the
executive branch) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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reverse course and agree to the creation of a commission .6 House,
Senate, and White House negotiations resulted in the designation of a
ten-member, bipartisan27 commission, comprised of "prominent
United States citizens, with national recognition, 12 8 and housed in the
legislative branch.29 The President would appoint the Commission's
Chairman and the Democratic House and Senate leadership would
select the Vice Chair. °
In contrast to the Joint Inquiry's sole focus on intelligence
failures,3' the Commission's inquiry would be extremely broad,
requiring significant investigation into the practices, policies, and
procedures of the executive branch.32  Congress charged the
Commission with investigating "relevant facts and circumstances
26. See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also Jim VandeHei, Officials See
Bush Insulated from Hill Probes, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2002, at A18 (explaining White
House resistance to an independent commission and subsequent reversal).
27. 6 U.S.C. § 101 note § 603(b)(1) (Supp. 2004) (stating that no more than five
members could come from each political party).
28. Id. § 603(b)(3).
29. Id. § 601.
30. Id. § 603(a).
31. The jurisdiction of the committees involved restricted the Joint Inquiry's scope.
See Press Release, United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate and
House Intelligence Committees Announce Joint Inquiry Into the September 11th Attacks
(Feb. 14, 2002), at http://intelligence.senate.gov/020214.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
32. One might ask why Congress would delegate to a fact-finding commission an
investigation that it might be able to conduct itself. In this case, one important benefit of
appointing a special commission, discussed infra at text accompanying note 126, is that
Congress could include in the Commission's jurisdiction a broad range of topics that
spanned the jurisdictions of several congressional committees. Because of the way
Congress is structured, a broader congressional investigation would have required each of
the committees with jurisdiction to be involved in the investigation, making for an
unwieldy and arguably inefficient process. But see Ross K. Baker, Where's Congress?,
WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2004, at B1, for a more cynical view. Baker argues that
congressional overuse of investigatory hearings, combined with bitter partisanship in
Congress, has led to independent inquiries in situations where credibility and
bipartisanship are especially important. Id. As noted earlier, congressional advocates of
an independent commission also recognized the credibility-related advantages that a
bipartisan, nonpolitical commission would have relative to a congressional investigation.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Note that there was no constitutional problem
with this congressional delegation to an independent commission. See Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 137-38 (1976), instructing that Congress generally may delegate "investigative
and informative" powers "falling in the same general category as those powers which
Congress might delegate to one of its own committees." The Court has recognized some
limits on Congress's power to delegate. For example, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1988), the Court held that congressional creation of the position of an independent
counsel does not impermissibly aggrandize legislative authority, but in Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714 (1986), the Court held that Congress may not delegate an executive function
to a legislative officer.
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relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, including any
relevant legislation, Executive Order, regulation, plan, policy,
practice, or procedure. ' 3   The Commission was also authorized to
include in its investigation:
[R]elevant facts and circumstances relating to: (i) intelligence
agencies; (ii) law enforcement agencies; (iii) diplomacy; (iv)
immigration, nonimmigrant visas, and border control; (v) the
flow of assets to terrorist organizations; (vi) commercial
aviation; (vii) the role of congressional oversight and resource
allocation; and (viii) other areas of the public and private
sectors determined relevant by the Commission for its inquiry.34
Additionally, Congress instructed the Commission to "identify,
review, and evaluate the lessons learned from the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, regarding the structure, coordination,
management policies, and procedures of the Federal
Government.... "35 By virtue of its mandate, then, the Commission
needed access to highly confidential executive branch information.
Congress therefore granted the Commission subpoena power but
conditioned the exercise of the subpoena power on bipartisan
agreement.36
II. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMMISSION AS A LEGISLATIVE
CREATURE
The designation of the Commission as a legislative body is
unique-none of the other commissions appointed to study a
particular event have been explicitly legislative bodies.37 Throughout
33. 6 U.S.C. 101 note § 604(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2004).
34. Id. § 604(a)(1)(B).
35. Id. § 604(a)(2).
36. Id. § 605(a)(2) (providing that subpoenas require agreement of the Chair and Vice
Chair or by affirmative vote of six commission members). See Helen Dewar, Bush
Doubted on 9/11 Panel, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2002, at A6 (discussing the White House
role in negotiating subpoena power).
37. The great majority of the independent commissions mentioned during
congressional debate on the creation of a 9/11 Commission were created by Executive
Order and were located in the executive branch. See MARCY, supra note 18, at 92-93
(discussing the Roberts Commission created to investigate Pearl Harbor); Chronology of
Key Public Events, at http://www.fas~org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chron.htm (last visited Apr. 12,
2005) (noting that the presidential "Tower Commission" preceded congressional and
special prosecutor investigations) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Congress had granted subpoena power to some of these independent commissions. See,
e.g., Pub. L. No. 88-202, 77 Stat. 362 (1963) (granting subpoena power to the Warren




the debate over the Commission's creation, there was little on-the-
record mention in Congress about how such a commission should be
institutionally situated.38 Only the final version of the legislation
included language about the Commission's establishment "in the
legislative branch."39 Press accounts do not mention the institutional
designation of the Commission as a point of contention in
negotiations between the White House and Congress. n°
However, as the Commission began its work, its institutional
locus would become extremely important-perhaps more important
than either Congress or the White House appreciated during
negotiations over the Commission's creation. Within a few weeks of
the Commission's inception, the designated institutional "home" of
the Commission became a source of legislative-executive controversy.
The executive branch initially argued that, by virtue of the President's
power to appoint the Commission's chairman, the Commission was
not a purely legislative body.41 In response, the Congressional
Research Service ("CRS"), the widely-respected nonpartisan
research service for Congress,42  advised Congress that the
Commission was, as the statute explicitly provided, a "legislative"
commission, notwithstanding the President's appointment of the
chairman.43 Ceding to Congress's view, the executive branch used the
38. The only suggestion that the President should have appointed a commission
immediately after September 11 came from Rep. Kind of Wisconsin. See 148 CONG. REC.
H5434 (daily ed. July 24, 2002). While members of Congress and the families of the
September 11 victims advocated for an independent commission, rather than a
congressional investigation, see supra notes 16, 17, 25, there was no discussion of the
commission itself being designated as "legislative."
39. Compare S. 1867, 107th Congress (1st Sess. 2001), and H.R. 4777, 107th Congress
(2d Sess. 2002) (earlier drafts of the legislation not specifying commission's institutional
placement), with 6 U.S.C. § 101 note § 601 (Supp. 2004) (establishing 9/11 Commission in
the legislative branch).
40. See, e.g., Dewar, supra note 19 (discussing panel composition, timeline, scope of
inquiry, and subpoena power as points of contention, but not mentioning the panel's
institutional designation).
41. The White House had appointed Henry Kissinger as Chairman and claimed that
he was an executive branch employee not subject to congressional ethics rules. See Dan
Eggen, Kissinger to Withhold Client List, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2002, at A43. When
Kissinger stepped down, President Bush instead appointed Thomas Kean, the well-
respected former governor of New Jersey, to chair the Commission. See Amy Goldstein,
9/11 Panel Gets New Chairman: Ex-N.J. Governor Kean Named to Replace Kissinger,
WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2002, at Al.
42. See About CRS, at http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/whatscrs.html (last visited Apr. 12,
2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review), for information about CRS.
43. See Memorandum'from Jack Maskell, Congressional Research Service, to Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs on Supervising Ethics Agency for Purposes of Ethics
in Government Act Disclosures for Members of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, at 2, at http://www.senate.gov/-gov-affairs/
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Commission's legislative designation as its rationale for limiting
access to executive branch evidence. 44
From a legal perspective, the designation of the Commission as a
legislative body meant that the Commission did not have any lesser or
greater powers than did Congress itself to compel executive branch
disclosure or to order the testimony of a presidential advisor.45 The
breadth and limits of Congress's investigatory powers have been well
established by judicial interpretation to include those exercised
pursuant to congressional lawmaking and oversight functions.46
However, Congress's power to demand executive branch information
is not absolute. Presidents have historically tried to protect executive
branch turf,47 especially in matters of national security and foreign
affairs.' Given its legislative designation, the separation-of-powers
911crsreport.pdf (Dec. 11, 2002) (finding the Commission to be "legislative" because "it
has no significant executive functions ... but rather is constituted only to conduct fact-
finding, investigation, recommendation and reporting .... ) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). Finding support for its position from the executive branch itself,
CRS cited a 1989 White House Office of Legal Counsel opinion, prepared in reference to
another commission, which concluded that the president's appointment of commission
members does not prevent a commission from being "legislative." Id. This analysis is
consistent, generally, with the Supreme Court's approach. See Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 368-69 (1989) (discussing that Presidential appointment and Senate
confirmation of United States Sentencing Commission members did not interfere with
agency's location in the judicial branch).
44. See Gonzales Letter, supra note 10 ("White House advisors and staff are not
subject to the jurisdiction of legislative bodies .... "); Interview by Roundtable of Wire
and Print Journalists with Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, Washington,
D.C., at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040324-2.html (Mar. 24,2004)
(calling the 9/11 Commission "a body under Article II [sic] of the legislature") (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review); Press Briefing by Scott McClellan, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040309-5.html#1 (Mar. 9, 2004)
(discussing White House's willingness to cooperate with "a legislative body" because of
the importance of the Commission's work) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
45. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996) (discussing the Court's
willingness to allow Congress to delegate as much power as it has but no more); see also
supra note 32 (discussing Congress's delegation of authority).
46. See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177 (1927) (holding that a
congressional committee investigating possible criminal wrongdoing by the Attorney
General and Department of Justice was legitimate because the "subject [of investigation]
was one on which legislation could be had and would be materially aided by the
information which the investigation was calculated to elicit"); see also LOuIS FISHER,
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: SUBPOENAS AND CONTEMPT POWER 6, at
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL31836.pdf (Apr. 2, 2003) ("Legislative
inquiries must be authorized by Congress, pursue a valid legislative purpose, raise
questions relevant to the issue being investigated, and inform witnesses why questions put
to them are pertinent.") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
47. FISHER, supra note 9, at xv.
48. Id. at 229-31. The Court's dicta in United States v. Nixon, 483 U.S. 683, 706
(1974), has bolstered presidential claims of privilege in the areas of national security, the
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constraints that would have applied to a congressional inquiry applied
equally to the Commission,'4  and the executive branch had an
equivalent prerogative to assert privilege over its materials and
personnel against the Commission's subpoena as it would have
against a congressional subpoena." Thus, had the Commission used
its subpoena power in an attempt to compel disclosure of White
House intelligence information or force the testimony of White
House officials, it is likely the White House would have formally
asserted executive privilege to protect intra-executive branch
deliberations and communications; in taking such an action, the
White House would have sought to protect both the executive branch
as an institution and the particular information sought by the
Commission. Had the Commission and the White House been
unable to reach a mutually acceptable agreement, a court would have
been asked to adjudicate the dispute.51
There is little case law-and no Supreme Court decision-
addressing the ability of Congress to compel executive branch
production of information to assist with a congressional investigation,
and no case law at all exists on the prerogatives of an independent
legislative commission to compel executive branch disclosure. The
leading case on separation of powers and executive privilege, United
States v. Nixon,52 addresses the ability of the judicial branch to compel
the President to produce evidence for use in a criminal trial.53
military, and foreign affairs. FISHER, supra note 9, at 229. See MARK J. ROZELL,
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC
ACCOUNTABILITY 51-53 (1994), for a defense of presidential secrecy and presidential
invocations of executive privilege in national security and foreign affairs.
49. In Nixon, the Court held that a separation-of-powers inquiry should:
[F]ocusf on the extent to which it [congressional action] prevents the Executive
Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.... Only where
the potential for disruption is present must we then determine whether that impact
[on the executive] is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within
the constitutional authority of Congress.
Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974)), appeal at Nixon v. Freeman, 670 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
50. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974). ("[T]he privilege ...
derive[s] from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional
duties."); see also Harold C. Relyea, The Law: Homeland Security: The Concept and the
Presidential Coordination Office-First Assessment, 32 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 397, 401
(2002) (discussing the presidential prerogative, expressed through threatened or actual
invocation of executive privilege, to limit congressional access to presidential advisors).
51. Although, as Louis Fisher explains, such disputes are rarely resolved judicially.
See FISHER, supra note 9, at 4.
52. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
53. Id. at 715 (stating the general principle that it is in the "public interest to afford
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However, both Nixon and lower court decisions recognize that
different, and often less compelling, justifications come into play in
weighing claims of executive privilege against a legislative inquiry
than in weighing executive claims against judicial requests. 4 Lower
courts have attempted to adjudicate legislative-executive information
disputes on just a handful of occasions in the past thirty years,5 with
no clear standard for the conditions under which legislative bodies
may compel executive branch disclosure. The most consistent
statement that can be made about the judiciary's role in adjudicating
legislative-executive disputes is that courts have a clear preference
that the two branches seek a mutually agreeable compromise rather
than a judicial resolution. 6 The Court of Appeals for the District of
Presidential confidentiality the greatest protection consistent with the fair administration
of justice"). At issue in Nixon were the famous Watergate tapes, which the D.C. District
Court had subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial of Nixon advisors involved in the
Watergate break-in. Id. at 687-88. Nixon claimed privilege on the grounds that the tapes
contained conversations with presidential aides and advisors. Id. at 686. The Court
ultimately ruled that, although presumptively privileged, the material on the tapes would
be subject to in camera review because the special prosecutor had demonstrated that the
material was " 'essential to ... justice' " in the underlying criminal case. Id. at 713
(quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (1807)).
54. See id. at 712 n.19 (expressly excluding legislative-executive disclosure from the
reach of the holding); In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (making no
judgment about whether the application of executive privilege to the communications of
senior White House officials in the judicial context would apply in the legislative context);
Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 732
(D.C. Cir. 1974) ("There is a clear difference between Congress's legislative tasks and the
responsibility of a grand jury, or any institution engaged in like functions.").
55. United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384,395 (D.C. Cir. 1976), appeal at 567 F.2d 121,
132-33 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (suggesting to parties that limited disclosure of executive branch
documents through in camera review might assist them in resolving disputes); Senate Select
Comm., 498 F.2d at 733 (holding that the committee's need for information was "too
attenuated and too tangential to its functions" to require the President's compliance with
congressional subpoena); United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 152
(D.D.C. 1983) (holding that resolution would not be proper unless Congress held the EPA
administrator in contempt of Congress). In recent litigation by members of Congress to
compel disclosure of executive branch data, the Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to
clarify the law in this area but declined to do so. See FISHER, supra note 9, at 161-78
(discussing Waxman v. Evans, Civil Action No. 01-4530 (D. Cal. 2002), vacated as moot by
52 Fed. Appx. 84 (9th Cir. 2002)).
56. AT&T, 551 F.2d at 394 (requiring further settlement negotiations between
legislature and executive branch before imposing judicial settlement); House of
Representatives, 556 F. Supp. at 152 ("When constitutional disputes arise concerning the
respective powers of the Legislative and Executive Branches, judicial intervention should
be delayed until all possibilities for settlement have been exhausted."); see also Louis
Fisher, Congressional Access to Information: Using Legislative Will and Leverage, 52
DUKE L.J. 323, 325 (2002) (stating that "[n]either political branch has incontestable
authority to withhold information or force its disgorgement" and discussing the "political
tools" Congress generally uses to force the release of executive branch information).
Fisher notes that the sparse case law in this area reflects the tendency of the political
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Columbia Circuit has noted that "[a] compromise worked out
between the branches is most likely to meet their essential needs and
the country's constitutional balance."57  As one scholar observed:
"There is no reason to think that greater involvement by courts would
be constructive or helpful.... Political understandings and
settlements have kept executive-legislative conflicts over information
to a manageable level. Legal and constitutional principles serve as
guides, but no more than that."58
The most instructive cases, Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon59 and United States v.
A T&T,' set out the basic considerations in an inter-branch dispute: a
preference for private settlement and, in the absence of settlement, a
balancing of competing legislative and executive needs. Particularly
relevant to the 9/11 Commission's requests for intelligence
information, the AT&T court noted the "severe problems in
formulating and applying standards" that a court would face in
weighing congressional demands against the executive's desire for
confidentiality over matters of national security:
61
Granted that the subpoenas are clearly within the proper
legislative investigatory sphere, it is difficult to "weigh"
Congress's need .... As to the danger to national security, a
court would have to consider the Subcommittee's track record
for security, the likelihood of a leak if other members of the
House sought access to the material. In addition to this delicate
and possibly unseemly determination, the court would have to
weigh the effect of a leak on intelligence activities and
diplomatic relations. Finally, the court would have to consider
the reasonableness of the alternatives offered by the parties and
decide which would better reconcile the competing
constitutional interests.62
Rather than resolve the conflict before it, the AT&T court "pause[d]
branches to reach compromises rather than seek judicial intervention. Id.
57. AT&T, 551 F.2d at 394.
58. Fisher, supra note 56, at 401.
59. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (assessing the committee's ability to compel
production of taped telephone conversations between Nixon and his aides regarding any
criminal acts that occurred in connection with the 1972 presidential election).
60. 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (assessing whether Congress could defeat executive
branch order enjoining AT&T from responding to congressional subpoena seeking
executive branch-ordered warrantless "national security" wiretaps), appeal at 567 F.2d 121
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
61. AT&T, 551 F.2d at 394.
62. Id.
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to allow for further efforts at a settlement" before "moving on to a
decision of such nerve-center constitutional questions."'63
The Senate Select Committee court provided additional guidance.
It recognized the public interest in a presumption favoring executive
branch confidentiality and cautioned that the strength of the
legislature's claim would be based "on whether the subpoenaed
evidence is demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the
Committee's functions."'64 The court declined to grant the
committee's request.6"
Senate Select Committee and AT&T illustrate the reluctance of
the judicial branch to resolve legislative-executive disputes and shed
light on what a court's approach to resolving disputes between the
9/11 Commission and the executive branch might have been. Had
there been judicial intervention in the relationship between the 9/11
Commission and the executive branch, the court would have
considered whether the Commission had overstepped its bounds as a
legislative body,66 whether the information sought from the executive
branch was "demonstrably critical" to the Commission's investigation
and unavailable elsewhere,67 and whether the executive branch's right
to invoke privilege was outweighed by the Commission's need for
information.6' Because the information sought related to national
security and intelligence matters, a court would likely have accorded
great weight to executive branch assertions of privilege69 and would
63. Id.
64. Senate Select Comm., 498 F.2d at 731.
65. Id. at 732-33 (holding that the tapes had already been made available to the
House Judiciary Committee, making the Senate's desire for the tapes "merely
cumulative").
66. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) (holding that "the power of
[congressional] inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function").
67. Senate Select Comm., 498 F.2d at 731.
68. Id.; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) (balancing executive
branch confidentiality with the needs of another governmental branch).
69. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710-11 (implying that presidential authority over foreign
affairs, intelligence, and diplomacy should be treated more deferentially than other
information); see also Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 671,
685 (D.D.C. 1988) (invalidating a statute that limited executive's use of secrecy
agreements based on the proposition that "congressional intrusion upon the President's
oversight of national security information be more severely limited than might be required
in matters of purely domestic concern"), vacated and remanded sub nom. by Am. Foreign
Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153, 161-62 (1989) (remanding to decide if a
congressional statute "impermissibly intrudes upon the Executive Branch's authority over
national security information"). But see United States v. North, 708 F. Supp. 380, 383
(D.D.C. 1988) ("[C]ongressional committees act well within their authority when they
seek explanation from Executive Branch officials .... It is essential that Congress
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have scrutinized the Commission's procedures for keeping the
information confidential.7" Furthermore, because "occasion[s] for
constitutional confrontation between the two branches"71 should be
avoided whenever possible,72 a court would likely have required the
9/11 Commission and the executive branch to attempt to reach a
settlement in order to avoid rendering judgment.73 Considering the
negotiations that ultimately occurred between the Commission and
the White House, one might argue that the parties settled their
disputes exactly as a court would have ordered.
III. NEGOTIATION OF INFORMATION SHARING
Given the time delays, uncertain outcome, and publicity that
would have accompanied judicial intervention, neither the
Commission nor the executive branch seemed anxious for a legal
confrontation. Thus, despite the equivalent legal right to request
executive branch information shared by both the legislatively-housed
9/11 Commission and the Joint Inquiry,74 the executive branch treated
the Commission quite differently than it had treated the Joint Inquiry
in providing access to intelligence information and access to
personnel.7" The Commission ultimately received "unprecedented"
legislate based on fact, not falsifications, in the realm of foreign affairs .... ). In a
different context, the Supreme Court recently rejected the President's national security
separation-of-powers argument in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650-51 (2004),
holding that citizens' due process rights trump the latitude given to the executive branch in
military actions absent the suspension of due process rights by Congress.
70. United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1976), appeal at 567 F.2d 121
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
71. Cheney v. Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2576, 2592 (2004) (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at
692).
72. See United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D.D.C.
1983).
73. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
74. The critical difference, discussed infra note 126 and accompanying text, was the
Commission's broad scope of inquiry. The Joint Inquiry was limited only to intelligence
issues, while the Commission's mandate included intelligence issues as well as several
other areas of inquiry. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
75. Compare July 8 Press Briefing, supra note 12, at 4 (noting that the Commission
had received access to detainee interviews and expected to receive National Security
Council documents that the Joint Inquiry had been unable to get), with Appendix: Access
Limitations Encountered by the Joint Inquiry, JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 20
(describing denials of access to intelligence information, id. at 1-5, conditions and
limitations, id. at 5-6, and delays, id. at 6-7, on receipt of information from the executive
branch), and JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 20, at 253-54 (noting that White House
invoked executive privilege over preliminary intelligence budget requests and covert
spending figures to prevent a "chilling" effect on President-advisor relations); see also
Dana Priest & Dana Milbank, 9/11 Panel Asks What Briefers Told Bush, WASH. POST,
Sept. 22, 2002, at Al, A19 (citing White House assertions that "[r]eleasing the records
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cooperation from the executive branch.7 6 Both the executive branch
and the Commission maintained publicly that the information sharing
that eventually occurred would not set legal precedent for future
legislative-executive interactions.77 Information-sharing agreements
emerged in three main areas: (1) access to Presidential Daily Brief
("PDB") materials, which provide daily intelligence information to
the President and have been called "sacrosanct";7" (2) the
Commission's meeting with President Bush and Vice President
Cheney; and (3) the White House's agreement to let National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice testify publicly and under oath
related to the president [to the Joint Inquiry] ... would inhibit Bush's closest advisers-
and the future advisers of future presidents-from giving their most candid advice, for fear
it might be made public and might be embarrassing"). The executive branch also fought
publicly with the Joint Inquiry over whether the Secretaries of State and Defense would
be allowed to testify. See James Risen, White House Drags Its Feet on Testifying at 9/11
Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2002, at A12. Ultimately, the Secretaries of State and
Defense, the Attorney General, and the National Security Advisor did not testify before
the Joint Inquiry. See Tim Roemer, Additional Views, appended to JOINT INQUIRY
REPORT, supra note 20, at 2 ("The Joint Inquiry would have benefited greatly ... had it
been able to hear directly from the most senior national security officials in the current
administration."). The 9/11 Commission secured public testimony under oath from all of
these officials. 9/11 REPORT, supra note 2, at 444-45 (listing witnesses at public hearings).
The Joint Inquiry was also unable to secure much of the information and witness
testimony it sought from the CIA and the FBI. See APPENDIX ON ACCESS LIMITATIONS,
JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 20, at 3. The 9/11 Commission was more successful
on this front as well. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
UNITED STATES: SECOND INTERIM REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 2, at http://www.9-
llcommission.gov/archive/report_2003-09-23.pdf (Sept. 23, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); Transcript, 9/11 Commission Press Briefing, at 7-8, at
http://www.9-llcommnission.gov/archive/2003-09-23press-briefing.pdf (Sept. 23,2003) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
76. See Kean & Hamilton, supra note 6; Gonzales Letter, supra note 10; see also
Drew, supra note 7, at 10.
77. See Kean & Hamilton, supra note 6; Gonzales Letter, supra note 10. As discussed
infra, the White House crafted agreements with the 9/11 Commission and, in one case,
Congress, that provided assurances that the sharing of information with the Commission
would not set legal precedent for future congressional or commission requests. See infra
Parts III.A-C. Whether these agreements are legally binding on future commissions or on
Congress is likely to be a hypothetical question, since, for political reasons, it is unlikely
that either party would point to these agreements as legally enforceable. Rather, the value
of the agreements was largely a symbolic recognition that each side recognized the
separation-of-powers issues involved in information sharing and acknowledged that the
executive branch's willingness to share information with the Commission hinged on the
unique circumstances surrounding September 11 and the Commission's need for
information that could not be obtained elsewhere.
78. Dan Eggen, 9/11 Panel to Have Rare Glimpse of Presidential Briefings, WASH.
POST, Nov. 16, 2003, at A9 (quoting Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, former general counsel
to the CIA and the current dean of the law school at the University of the Pacific).
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before the Commission.79 Each of these three agreements will be
considered in turn.
A. The PDBs
When the executive branch and the Commission announced a
plan that would allow a select group of commissioners access to
materials from the PDBs, the press cited legal scholars calling the
arrangement "a watershed moment in the long history of battles
between the executive branch and outside investigators over matters
of presidential secrecy and privilege . ".. .80 The plan gave a
subcommittee of commissioners limited access to a subset of
documents the White House identified as responsive to the
Commission's requests; the White House retained the right to review
and edit the commissioners' notes before releasing the notes to the
Commission.81  Additionally, as part of the agreement, one
commissioner and the Commission's executive director were allowed
access to a more extensive set of PDB materials to determine whether
any were "demonstrably critical to the Commission's mandate and
should therefore be added to the core group .... "82 The White
House had to approve the additions.83 Thus, by a carefully crafted
79. See Gonzales Letter, supra note 10 (allowing Rice testimony). The Commission
also heard testimony under oath from other key executive department officials that had
not testified before the Joint Inquiry, including the Secretaries of State and Defense, the
Director of the CIA, and the Attorney General. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 2, at 439,
444 (listing witnesses and specifying that all witnesses in 2004 testified under oath); see
also Broder, supra note 14 (describing differences in the ability of cabinet members versus
presidential advisors to testify).
80. Eggen, supra note 78. Eggen quotes Georgetown University Law Professor Neal
Katyal expressing the unusual nature of the arrangement: "[It] is an extraordinarily broad
step towards openness.... We're not talking about some minor cable from an embassy in
Lima here. We're talking about the PDB." Id.
81. See Statement by the 9/11 Commission, at http://www.9-llcommission.gov/press/
pr_2003-11-12.pdf (Nov. 12, 2003) (describing the PDB review process) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
82. Statement by the 9/11 Commission, at http://www.9-1lcommission.gov/press/
pr_2003-11-20.pdf (Nov. 20, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The
"demonstrably critical" language reflects the Senate Select Committee court's approach.
498 F.2d 725, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
83. Id. The "screening" process agreed to might be compared to that used in Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 451-53 (1977) (approving use of archivists
to screen out potentially privileged information), appeal at Nixon v. Freeman, 670 F.2d 346
(D.C. Cir. 1982), or the use of in camera review approved in United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 714 (1974). Interactions between the White House and the Commission
continued to be strained even after the agreement was reached-press accounts reported
that the Commission contemplated issuing subpoenas for notes that the White House
refused to release. Dan Eggen, White House Holding Notes Taken by 9/11 Commission:
Panel May Subpoena Its Summaries of Bush Briefings, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2004, at A2;
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compromise, using a test that a court might have used to balance the
interests of the Commission and the White House,'M the two sides
created an information-sharing agreement that for the first time
allowed a legislative body access to purely internal, high-level
executive branch national security documents .8  The Commission
said this process enabled them to procure all the information they
required.86 The executive branch was able to say that it had provided
the Commission with the information it sought but without eroding
the executive's privilege to control internal deliberative information.87
B. Presidential/Vice Presidential Meeting
Negotiations over the Commission's ability to speak with the
President and Vice President were equally delicate. From its
inception, and with the knowledge that it had no enforceable legal
means to compel a meeting with the President,88 the Commission
sought a meeting with President Bush.89 Although the Commission's
Chairman publicly recognized that legal precedent and tradition
weighed against either sitting or former Presidents or Vice Presidents
testifying under oath,90 the Commission pressed the White House for
a substantive discussion. 91
After initially refusing any meeting between the Commission and
Philip Shenon, Bush, in Reversal, Supports More Time for 9/11 Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
5, 2004, at A21. However, the two sides continued to negotiate and eventually reached
further agreement on the release of the commissioners' notes on the PDB materials and
the commissioners' ability to share the notes with the entire Commission. Statement by
the 9/11 Commission, at http://www.9-l1commission.gov/press/pr-2004-02-10.pdf (Feb. 10,
2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
84. See supra notes 62--64 and accompanying text.
85. See Eggen, supra note 78 (citing legal scholars); Kean & Hamilton, supra note 6.
86. See Statement by 9/11 Commission (Nov. 12, 2003), supra note 81; Kean &
Hamilton, supra note 6.
87. See Statement by 9/11 Commission (Nov. 12, 2003), supra note 81; see also Kean &
Hamilton, supra note 6 (calling the agreement "unprecedented and constitutionally
delicate").
88. Courts have only rarely required a sitting president to participate in judicial
proceedings. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 704-05 (1997). A president has never
been forced by a court to provide legislative testimony.
89. See Sanger, supra note 13 (discussing White House concessions to Commission
requests).
90. NBC News Meet the Press, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4663767 (Apr. 4,
2004) (transcript including discussion with Commission members Kean and Hamilton) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
91. See Philip Shenon, 9/11 Panel Rejects White House Limits on Interviews, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2004, at A12 (reporting that the Commission rejected the White House's
initial proposal as "not good enough").
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the President,91 the White House eventually agreed that the President
would meet with all ten commissioners on the condition the Vice
President would also be present.93 The White House made its offer
subject to the understanding that the meeting would not set a legal
precedent for future presidential testimony and that neither he nor
the Vice President would be under oath.94 The Commission agreed to
conduct the private, unrecorded meeting at the White House with
only one Commission note-taker present. The meeting between the
Commission and the President and Vice President was historic;
96
President Reagan is the only sitting president in recent history to
appear before an independent commission,' and a sitting president
has appeared before a legislative body on only one occasion.98
However, the conditions under which the meeting occurred-at the
White House, behind closed doors, without a formal record, and
without anyone except the commissioners and one note-taker
present-arguably maintained symbolic and constitutional
boundaries between the legislative and executive spheres. The
historic and tragic nature of September 11 further added to the
executive branch's assertion that the meeting should be construed as
an isolated "accommodation" 9  rather than a precedent-setting event.
92. See Philip Shenon, Bush Vows to Answer All Questions Posed by 9/11 Panel, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2004, at A18.
93. See Gonzales Letter, supra note 10. The White House initially said the meeting
could last only one hour, but later agreed to extend the one hour time limit after the
Commission held three hour meetings with former President Clinton and former Vice
President Gore. Ultimately, the President and Vice President also had a three hour
meeting with the Commission. See Press Briefing by Scott McClellan, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040429-4.htm (Apr. 29, 2004) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
94. See Brian Knowlton, In Rare Step, Bush Goes To 9/11 Panel, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Apr. 30, 2004, at 1 (discussing Gonzales's letter on separation of powers).
95. Id. (noting there is "no formal transcript for future historians to study").
96. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Bush, Clinton Agree to Testify Privately to Panel Probing
9/11, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2004, at A12 (discussing the historical significance of Bush's
meeting and drawing a parallel to Lyndon Johnson's submitting a three page statement to
the commission investigating President Kennedy's assassination, rather than meeting with
the panel in person); Knowlton, supra note 94 (describing the questioning of the President
and Vice President by the Commission).
97. Laura Sullivan, 'Very Cordial' Session for Bush and 9/11 Panel, BALT. SUN, Apr.
30,2004, at 1A.
98. CBS News & Associated Press, Bush 9/11 Meeting: Turning Point, at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/29/terror/main614693.shtml (Apr. 28, 2004)
(noting President Ford's testimony before a congressional committee regarding his Nixon
pardon) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
99. See Gonzales Letter, supra note 10.
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C. Rice Testimony
The White House's decision to allow National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice to testify before the Commission under oath poses
the most significant challenge to the separation-of-powers doctrine.
As a general rule " 'it is a longstanding principle, rooted in the
Constitutional separation of powers and the authority vested in the
President by Article II... that White House officials generally do not
testify before Congress, except in extraordinary circumstances
.. The Bush administration advanced this rationale to explain
its objection to the Commission's request for Dr. Rice's public
testimony.1 1 However, the White House eventually acceded to the
Commission's request, couching its decision in terms of the "unique"
circumstances that arose from September 11.12 In explaining the
terms under which the testimony could occur, the White House
Counsel wrote:
We continue to believe ... that the principles underlying the
Constitutional separation of powers counsel strongly against
such public testimony, and that Dr. Rice's testimony before the
Commission can occur only with recognition that the events of
September 11, 2001 present the most extraordinary and unique
circumstances, and with conditions and assurances designed to
100. FISHER, supra note 9, at 199 (2004) (quoting Letter from Jack Quinn, White
House Counsel, to Rep. William H. Zeliff Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee on National
Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice, May 8, 1996). See also Transcript, A
Forum on the Role of the National Security Advisor, Rice University, Apr. 12, 2001, at
17-19, at http://webcast.rice.edu/speeches/text/20010412secadv.pdf, for a discussion among
former national security advisors about the reluctance of former presidents to allow the
National Security advisor to testify before Congress or answer questions of members of
Congress (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
101. Initially, the White House only allowed Rice to meet privately with the
Commission; the meeting took place on a Saturday at the White House. See Mike Allen,
Rice 9/11 Testimony May Be Released, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2004, at A3; see also Gregg
Wirth, Rice to Testify Publicly Before 9/11 Panel, NEWSHOUR EXTRA, at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/jan-juneO4/rice_4-07.html (Apr. 7, 2004)
(describing the initial Rice meeting with the Commission) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
102. Gonzales Letter, supra note 10. In the weeks leading up to the White House's
decision to allow Rice's testimony, Rice had appeared before the national press to refute
allegations of pre-9/11 intelligence failures made by former National Security Counsel
counterterrorism chief of staff, Richard Clarke. Rice's public discussions about her advice
to the president weakened the White House's claimed need for secrecy. See, e.g., Dan
Eggen, Commissioners Eager to Question Rice, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2004, at A12
(describing the upcoming questioning of Rice); Hope Yen, Associated Press, Experts See
No Law Barring Rice Testimony, at http://cvilleindymedia.org/newswire.php?story-id=323
(Mar. 29, 2004) (quoting legal scholars on weakened grounds for privilege claim) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
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limit harm to the ability of future Presidents to receive candid
advice.103
The counsel's letter described the President's willingness to allow
Dr. Rice to testify as "a matter of comity" and notwithstanding his
"legal authority to decline to make Dr. Rice available to testify in
public ...... ,1 The terms of the agreement included assurances from
congressional leaders that "Dr. Rice's public testimony ... should not
be cited as ... precedent for future requests for a National Security
Advisor or any other White House official to testify before a
legislative body."10 5 The Commission had to agree that Dr. Rice's
testimony did not set precedent "for future Commission requests ...
[or] for testimony by a National Security Advisor or any other White
House official," and that if Rice testified, the Commission would not
seek further testimony from any other White House official or from
Dr. Rice herself.1°6
IV. THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INFORMATION-SHARING
AGREEMENTS
The executive branch made a noticeable effort throughout its
negotiation of all three disputes and in its final information-sharing
agreements with the Commission to ensure that it would not set legal
or political precedent for itself or for future administrations when
faced with demands from congressional committees or independent
commissions.0 7  The "extraordinary and unique circumstances"'1 8
surrounding September 11 were used as justifications by both sides to
explain how the Commission's need for information and the
Commission's broad mandate exceeded that of a typical congressional
inquiry. Each of the three most visible accommodations came with an
explicit promise from the Commission (and, in the case of the Rice
testimony, from Congress) that giving intra-executive branch
information to the Commission in no way affected the constitutional
right of the Administration to withhold information as "privileged."' 9




107. Legal scholars cited in the popular press appear to agree with the assertions of the
White House and the Commission that the agreements would not set a legal precedent.
See, e.g., Eggen, supra note 78 (quoting Georgetown law professor Neal Katyal calling the
9/11 Commission "a 'special animal' ").
108. Gonzales Letter, supra note 10.
109. See supra notes 87, 94, 102 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, the arrangements themselves implicitly
acknowledged the formal separation of the legislative and executive
spheres: the sharing of PDB materials allowed the Commission to see
the White House-selected materials but gave the executive branch
continued control over the Commission's ability to retain and use the
information;110 the President and Vice President's meeting recognized
the separation of powers by allowing the executive branch to dictate
the restrictive terms of the meeting.' Among the three agreements,
only the Rice testimony has arguable precedential value because it is
the first time a White House advisor has testified under oath before a
legislative body on a matter not related to a criminal investigation or
breaking scandal.112 Still, the explicit statements the executive branch
secured from both Congress and the Commission,"3 the uniquely
broad mandate of the 9/11 Commission, and the longstanding
tradition of shielding executive branch officials from legislative
inquiry" 4 will likely serve to insulate White House advisors from any
legal presumption of enhanced congressional access.
Given the reluctance of courts to create hard and fast rules for
inter-branch information sharing," 5 the 9/11 Commission's experience
is unlikely to have created a rigid shift in judicial perceptions of the
balance between the legislative and executive branches. However, it
is possible that the information revealed may affect the balance in the
kinds of information that courts are willing to entertain as
"demonstrably critical"' 16 to a congressional investigation when
balancing legislative versus executive needs, should a future
legislative-executive conflict require judicial resolution."7 Although
executive branch claims of privilege have traditionally been strongest
110. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
112. See FISHER, supra note 9, at 63, 199-227 (discussing occasions on which
presidential advisors have appeared before Congress); see also Yen, supra note 102
(same).
113. See Hamilton & Kean, supra note 6; Gonzales Letter, supra note 10.
114. See Gonzales Letter, supra note 10.
115. See supra notes 54-73 and accompanying text.
116. Senate Select Comm. v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
117. See supra notes 55-65 (discussing the infrequency of judicial intervention in
legislative disputes). Because judicial resolution of inter-branch disputes rarely occurs, it
is difficult to say what "demonstrably critical" means in practice. As one scholar noted,
"the court has refrained from becoming involved in how to strike that balance [between
legislative and executive needs] in individual cases or even in providing significant
guidelines on how individual cases should be resolved." Todd David Peterson,
Congressional Oversight of Open Criminal Investigations, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1373,
1423 (2002).
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in areas of intelligence and national security,"8 and while those in the
executive branch argue that executive branch prerogative in these
areas should be even greater in a post-September 11 world because of
the complexities of modern national security concerns,1 9 the
information uncovered by the 9/11 Commission may cause courts to
reconsider traditional deference to the executive branch. For
example, the executive branch PDBs and other intelligence
documents provided the Commission with evidence that two
presidential administrations had not done as much as the intelligence
reports warranted to protect the United States against terrorist
attacks. 2° Similarly, Dr. Rice's testimony allowed the Commission to
uncover the provocative title of one PDB memo that the executive
branch had previously shielded both from the Commission and from
the earlier congressional Joint Inquiry. 1' The substantive significance
of these disclosures, as well as the other information shared by the
executive branch and Congress that enabled the Commission to
produce its report, could lead courts to reassess their role in
brokering legislative-executive disputes in a post-September 11
world. 22 Thus, it is possible that in a future case involving an
information-sharing dispute, the strong presumption of executive
branch privilege that courts traditionally attach to national security
and intelligence information may weaken in light of this recent
118. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710-11 (1974). The basis for inherent
executive power in foreign affairs is Article II, section 2 of the United States Constitution,
which designates the President's duties as Commander in Chief and outlines the
President's preeminent role in treaty-making with foreign nations.
119. See, e.g., Christina E. Wells, "National Security" Information and the Freedom of
Information Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1195, 1196-97 nn.5-7 (2004) (citing Bush
Administration initiatives to make classification of government documents easier and to
shield unclassified but sensitive national security documents from Freedom of Information
Act requests). In general, however, Wells notes that it is not unusual for the government
to impose secrecy restrictions in wartime. Id. at 1195-96; see also Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British and Israeli Experiences, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 1906, 1910-13 (2004) (discussing the executive branch's detention of United States
citizens and foreign nationals as "enemy combatants" and explaining the government's
rationale as grounded in the President's power as Commander in Chief to take whatever
steps he deems necessary without the involvement of other branches of government).
120. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 2, at 340-44.
121. See Transcript, Testimony of Condoleezza Rice before the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, at http://www.9-llcommission.gov/archive/
hearing9/9-llCommissionHearing-2004-04-08.htm (Apr. 8, 2004) (releasing title of Aug.
6 PDB, "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in United States") (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); see also Drew, supra note 7 (discussing the significance of this
disclosure).
122. Indeed, the 9/11 Commission recommended the need for better information
sharing within the executive branch itself, as well as the need for greater congressional
oversight of intelligence. See 9/11 REPORT, supra note 2, at 416-21.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
experience. On the other hand, one might also argue that the
successful 9/11 Commission-White House negotiated efforts would
prove to a court that positive, privately negotiated results make
judicial intervention unnecessary.
V. THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE INFORMATION-
SHARING AGREEMENTS
In addition to potential legal implications, the agreements
reached between the executive branch and the Commission serve as a
lesson in political negotiations. 23 The dynamics that promoted
mutually acceptable information-sharing arrangements may reinforce
the political benefits of independent commissions in the eyes of
congressional actors, 4 influence the means by which legislators
fashion independent commissions in the future,'125 and may similarly
affect the ability of future administrations to restrict the flow of
information to such future commissions. Several key factors enabled
the Commission to gain wider access to executive branch information
than had the Joint Inquiry.
First, the Commission's congressional mandate-to explore not
just intelligence failures but also "facts and circumstances relating to
law enforcement, diplomacy, immigration, terrorist financing,
aviation' ' 126 -was much broader than that of the Joint Inquiry.1 27 The
Commission's multi-faceted mandate and interdisciplinary
jurisdiction gave it a greater ability than the Joint Inquiry had to
request intra-executive branch information in valid exercise of its
investigative function. Both legally and politically, the Commission's
mandate made it more difficult for the executive branch to make
credible claims that the information sought was not within the
123. As congressional scholar Louis Fisher's book on executive-legislative relations
illustrates, Congress has developed an armory of tools to coax the executive branch to
share information with Congress; for example, Congress variously uses the appropriations
power, the subpoena power, contempt power, impeachment power, appointment power,
and resolutions of inquiry to compel disclosure of executive branch information. See
generally FISHER, supra note 9 (discussing the political struggles between Congress and
presidents that tend to get resolved independently of the courts). Perhaps the 9/11
Commission experience is best understood as a contribution to Congress's political toolkit.
124. Baker, supra note 32 (discussing the perceived advantage of independent
commissions as more credible and bipartisan than congressional inquiries).
125. For example, by providing future commissions with inter-disciplinary mandates
such as the 9/11 Commission's, 6 U.S.C. § 101 note § 604(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 2004), or housing
independent commissions in the legislature, 6 U.S.C. § 101 note § 601, to provide a check
on executive branch secrecy.
126. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 31-32, 75 and accompanying text.
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Commission's jurisdiction. 128
Second, the Commission decided early on that it would keep the
public informed about the state of its investigation and would hold as
many hearings in public as possible to make its work transparent to
the families of the victims of September 11 and the public at large;
129
in doing so, the Commission explicitly and effectively used publicity
to gain executive branch cooperation in producing evidence.130 By
contrast, the de facto mode of operation for congressional intelligence
committees is to hold private hearings that are less susceptible to
public scrutiny.131
Third, despite the executive branch's frequent references to the
Commission as a "legislative body" '132 and the Commission's actual
legislative designation, 33 the Commission chose to ignore its
institutional designation. The Commission pointed instead to its
broad mandate"3 to legitimize its requests for access to executive
branch information. At a July 2003 press briefing, Chairman Kean
explicitly stated that the Commission would not recognize separation-
of-powers barriers in its requests for information: "We are not
recognizing any barriers. We are assuming that our legislation and
the mandate that set us up give us the right to ask for anything-
128. See, e.g., Appendix: Access Limitations Encountered by the Joint Inquiry, JOINT
INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 20, at 5 (discussing the Defense Department's refusal to
provide the Joint Inquiry with information about the military's role in covert operations
based on "the position that the request exceeded the scope of the Joint Inquiry's
authority").
129. See July 8 Press Briefing, supra note 12, at 12 (Kean stating, "[Ojur mandate is...
to do something very public. ); 9/11 REPORT, supra note 2, at xv (stating that the goal
was "to share as much of our investigation as we can with the American people").
130. See July 8 Press Briefing, supra note 12, at 6 (Chairman Kean stating that the
Commission chose to publicize the Commission's difficulties in obtaining documents in
"the hope that those agencies that haven't been [cooperative] would be more
productive"). See generally Statements from the Commission, at http://www.9-
llcommission.gov/press/index.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2005) (collecting Commission
statements to the public, many ending with the intention to publicize access problems) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
131. See United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearings: 108th
Congress, at http://intelligence.senate.gov/hrl08.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2005) (listing
hearings and indicating whether open or closed) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearings: 107th
Congress, at http://intelligence.senate.gov/hrl07.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2005) (same) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also United States House of
Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Open Hearings, at
http://intelligence.house.gov/Reports.aspx?section=3 (last visited Apr. 12, 2005) (showing
seven open hearings in all of 2003-2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
132. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
133. 6 U.S.C. § 101 note § 601 (Supp. 2004).
134. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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anything from any agency or any individual that's pertinent to our
task." '135 The Commission's ability to frame itself as independent
validated its requests in the eyes of the media and the public and
aided the Commission in the public relations battle that ultimately
stimulated the executive branch to compromise with the Commission.
Fourth, through all of its dealings with the executive branch, the
Commission was keenly aware of its statutory deadline. From the
Commission's perspective, the deadline necessitated compromise in
order to gain access to evidence crucial to fulfilling its mandate. 36
The Commission's focus on its deadline provided more flexibility and
pragmatic willingness by both sides to compromise earlier in the
dispute than might otherwise occur in a legislative-executive battle
for information. While the Joint Inquiry, too, faced a temporal
deadline,137 the Commission used its deadline publicly as a rationale
for requiring expedited access 138 and as the reason it was willing to
settle for less than full access in exchange for an amicable resolution
to its disputes with the executive branch.'39 The fact that the
Commission members, as private citizens rather than elected leaders,
knew they would not face any tangible political repercussions for
compromising with the executive branch may also have aided their
willingness to settle for more limited access than they initially
requested.
Finally, neither the White House nor the Commission wanted to
resolve its disputes in court. On more than one occasion Chairman
Kean stated that some information was preferable to none: "A
subpoena, if resisted, means you see nothing in the meantime and you
go into court.... That may take a while, and the chances are good
135. July 8 Press Briefing, supra note 12, at 7.
136. See July 8 Press Briefing, supra note 12, at 8 (explaining Commission's willingness
to accept the presence of agency representatives at interviews with sitting executive
branch officials, Kean noted, "[W]e do not want to hold up the process ... we've got to
move ahead."); see also Eggen, supra note 78 and accompanying text (citing statements
made by Kean upon the announcement of the PDB agreement); Kean & Hamilton, supra
note 6.
137. The Congressional Record includes statements by several Senators and House
members that allude to the Joint Inquiry's deadline, which would expire at the end of the
107th Congress. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S9085-86 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2002) (statement
of Sen. Shelby).
138. See, e.g., Statement by the 9/11 Commission, at http://www.9-llcommission.gov/
press/pr_2003-10-15.pdf (Oct. 15, 2003) (noting concern that delays in the receipt of FAA
material would prevent the Commission from meeting its deadline) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). The Commission ultimately required a two-month extension on
delivery of its final report.
139. See Eggen, supra note 78.
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that you would lose."14  The executive branch, too, preferred to
compromise on its constitutional prerogatives rather than become
embattled in a legal fight. One journalist that closely followed the
Commission's progress attributed the White House's willingness to
provide limited access to the PDBs to "pressure to reach some deal,
given ... the threat of a politically damaging court fight if the panel
issued a subpoena."14'
While statements about the unique and tragic circumstances
surrounding September 11 were used to justify the release of intra-
executive branch information to the Commission, it is possible that
the Bush White House's actions could be used by future
congressional investigators or commissions to coerce executive
cooperation, either directly or by mobilizing public opinion in favor
of greater White House candor. On the other hand, future
presidential administrations could easily defuse such requests by
invoking the familiar caveat that the White House's decision to
release executive branch documents only occurred because of the
"unique and extraordinary"'14 2 circumstances of September 11, and by
arguing that the explicit, carefully crafted agreements between the
Commission and the White House must quell any future
presumptions of enhanced access. Notwithstanding another tragedy
like September 11, the future administration might argue, the
executive branch "accommodation" '143 to the legislative branch has no
precedential value. In this hypothetical future information struggle,
the outcome is more likely to be determined by the political forces of
the day than by legal rule.
140. Id. Discussing the PDB arrangement, Commissioners Kean and Hamilton wrote:
The ... executive's claim of executive privilege and state secrets is strong. If the
commission had subpoenaed these documents, the White House would no doubt
have fought the subpoena to avoid setting a damaging constitutional precedent....
The choice before us is not unrestricted access versus conditional access; the
choice is between access to fulfill our mandate and no access at all.
Kean & Hamilton, supra note 6. The Commission did use its subpoena power three times:
to compel document production by the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department
of Defense, and the City of New York. See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States, Frequently Asked Questions About the 9/11 Commission, at
http://www.9-llcommission.gov/about/faq.htm#qlO (last visited Apr. 12, 2005) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review). In all three cases, the requested documents were
produced without judicial intervention. Id.
141. Philip Shenon, Panel Reaches Deal on Access to 9/11 Papers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
2003, at A26 (noting also that the President's public pledge to help the Commission added
to the pressure leading to the PDB-sharing arrangement).
142. See Gonzales Letter, supra note 10.
143. Id.
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CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the factors that most likely influenced the
concessions between the executive branch and the 9/11 Commission
may serve more as a political lesson than as a legal imperative to a
future administration faced with legislative requests for executive
branch information. While it is unlikely that a court would order the
executive branch to forsake the constitutional doctrines of separation
of powers and executive privilege, it is conceivable that a future
presidential administration, influenced by the public momentum
behind independent investigatory efforts, would recognize that the
political benefits of cooperating with an investigation might outweigh
the benefits gained by assertions of privilege. It is also imaginable
that Congress learned a valuable lesson from the Commission
experience: establishing a commission in the legislative branch
assures independence from the executive branch, while affording the
opportunity for more access to information than the Congress itself
could procure and a more credible result than either a congressional
investigation or an independent Presidential commission generally
provides. Finally, although the relationship that evolved between the
Commission and the executive branch is unlikely to affect the
willingness of courts to intervene in legislative-executive disputes, it is
possible that the information the Commission was able to access, and
the substantive conclusions it was able to draw as a result of that
access, might prompt judges to consider more carefully than in the
past the legitimacy of congressional requests for executive branch
information; this may particularly be true in the areas of national
security and intelligence, which, as a result of September 11, have
become ever greater topics of public and congressional interest and
concern.
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